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NOTES
STRIKES BY GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES
I

In 1947 the federal, state and local governments had approximately 5.9
million employees, about one-tenth of the total working force of the nation.'
Stenographers, street-cleaners, shipyard workers, school teachers-almost all
trades, skills, and professions are represented in that number. 2 They may be
employed by the TVA or the county road commission, by the Post Office Department or the municipal golf course, but like all men who work for others they
sometimes have disputes with their employers. On numerous occasions such
disputes have led government employees to strike. 3 In 1940 an exhaustive study
of strikes by government employees showed that up to that time there were
records of 1,116 such strikes. 4 These strikes occurred in all parts of the country
1. Manvel, Public Employment in April, 1947, 8 GovT. Emrp. No. 4 (1947).
2. The question of who is a government employee is worthy of separate treatment.
It is treated in United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U. S. 258, 67 Sup. Ct.
677, 91 L. Ed. 884 (1947), 45 MicH L. REv. 469; It re Cleveland and Sandusky Brewing
Co., 11 F. Supp. 198 (N. D. Ohio 1935), 49 HARV. L. REv. 341, 45 YALE L. J. 372;
60 HARv. L. REV. 656 (1947).
3. The organization of unions and collective bargaining are interrelated means of
settling the labor relations difficulties of government employees; both raise questions
beyond the scope of this Note. The questions of unionization of government employees
and of the affiliation of unions of govenment employees with other unions are treated
in Perez v. Board of Police Commissioners, 75 Cal. App. 2d 638, 178 P. 2d 537 (1947) ;
People ex rel. Fursman v. Chicago, 278 Ill. 318, 116 N. E. 158 (1917) ; Fraternal Order of
Police v. Harris, 306 Mich. 68, 10 N. W. 2d 310 (1943), cert. denied, 321 U. S. 784 (1943) ;
Springfield v. Clouse, 356 Mo. 1239, 206 S. W. 2d 539 (1947); King v. Priest, 206 S. W.
2d 547 (Mo. 1947), appeal dismissed, 333 U. S. 852 (1948); Hutchinson v. Magee, 278
Pa. 119, 122 Atl. 234 (1923); C. I. 0. v. Dallas, 198 S. W. Zd 143 (Tex. Civ. App.
1946) ; Carter v. Thompson, 164 Va. 312, 180 S. E. 410 (1935); Seattle High School
Chap. No. 200 v. Sharples, 159 Wash. 424, 293 Pac. 994 (1930) ; COMMITTEE ON EmPLOYEE

RELATIONS

IN

THE

PUBLIC

SERvIcE,

EMPLOYEE

RELATIONS

IN

THE

PUBLIC-

SERvIcE (1942); RHYNE, LABoR-UNIONS AND MUNICIPAL EMPLOYEE LAW (1946);
WHITE, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION, c. 28 (1947);
ZISKIND, ONE THOUSAND STRIKES OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES (1940); Baldwin,
Have Public Employees the Right to Strikef-Yes, 30 NAT. MUNIC. REv. 515 (1941);
Kaplan, Have Public Employees the Right to Strike?-No, 30 NAT. MUNIC. REV.

518 (1941) ; Clapp, Problems of Union Relations in Public Agencies, 33 Am. EcoN. REv.
184 (Supp. 1943) ; Spero, Collective Bdrgaining in&the Public Service, 248 ANNALS 146
(1946); Union Contracts Covering Public Workers, 18 LAB. REL. REP. 46 (1946);
Notes, 47 COL. L. REV. 1161 (1947), 54 HARv. L. REv. 1360 (1941); Note, 162 A. L. R.
1106 (1946). For treatment of questions relating to collective bargaining in government,
see authorities cited suipra and Nutter v. Santa Monica, 74 Cal. App. 2d 292, 168 P. 2d
741 (1946); Miami Local No. 654 v. Miami, 157 Fla. 445, 26 So. 2d" 194 (1946);
Mugford v. Mayor, 185 Md. 266, 44 A. 2d 745 (1946), 94 U. OF PA. L. REV. 427;
Agger, The Government and Its Employees, 47 YALE L. J. 1109 (1938); Mire, Collectivc Bargaining in the Public Service, 36 Am . EcoN. REv. 347 (1946), discussed by
Anrod, id. at 375. For a discussion of union controls covering public workers see § 18
LAB REL. REP. 46 (1946). For a general discussion of labor relations problems of government employees, see Holt, Labor Rights of Public Employees, 2 S. W. L. 3. 226 (1948).
4. ZISKIND, ONE THOUSAND STRIKES OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES 187 (1940).
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and in all phases of government activity.5 Some strikes by government employees were successful; others were not.
Little effort has been made in developing a definite policy towards such
strikes. 6 In attempting to end these strikes the governmental employers concerned have resorted to strikebreakers, dismissals and threats of dismissal,
negotiation, conciliation "andeven formal arbitration. The course taken has depended upon the attitude of the controlling administrators and the exigencies
of the particular sit.uation.7 No officially reported case has been found where
court processes were used to prevent or to terminate a strike by government
employees. 8
Under the original common law view any combination of workers to
strike was illegal. 9 Such an attitude was unworkable in a democratic industrial
society. The legality of a strike then came to depend upon its objects and on the
means used to attain them. 10 Today the private employee's right to strike is
recognized in a number of federal and state statutes." There have been some
indications that the right to strike has become one of those "fundamental human
liberties" protected by the constitution.' 2 There is, however, no absolute right
to strike. 13 Limitations and restrictions are imposed by statute and by the
14
courts on the use of the strike by private employees.
There has been no express recognition by the legislatures or by the
courts of any right to strike by government employees. While no appellate
court has expressly denied that any such right exists, 15 several statutes have
5. Id. at 190.
6. Id. at 215.
7. Id. c. 14.

8. See, however, RHYNE, LABOR UNIONS & MUNICIPAL EMPLOYEE LAW 158
(1946), where an order issued by a Texas lower court restraining city employees from

striking is set out in full. In Los Angeles v. Los Angeles Building & Construction Trades
Council, 14 CCH LAB. CAS. U 64,405 (Calif. Super. Ct. 1948), municipal employees
were enjoined from striking.
9. People v. Fisher, 14 Wend. 1 (N. Y. 1835); FRANKFURTER AND GREENE, Tin
LABOR INJUNCTION C. 1

(1930) ;

LANDIS, CASES ON LABOR LAW C. 1

(1934).

10. State v. Stockford, 77 Conn. 227, 58 Atl. 769 (1904); RESTATEMENT, TORTS §§
775 et seq. (1939) ; Note, 41 MicIr. L. Rav. 1143 (1943).
11. E.g., 61 STAT. 151 (1947), 29 U. S. C. A. § 163 (1948); N. Y. LABOR LAW
§ 713.
12. "The right to peaceably strike, or to participate in one, to work or to refuse

to work, and to choose the terms and conditions under which one will work, like the

right to make a speech, are fundamental human liberties which the state may not condition or abridge in the absence of grave and immediate danger to the community."
Stapleton v. Mitchell, 60 F. Supp. 51 (D. Kan. 1945), appeal dismissed, 326 U. S.
690 (1945); Note, 47 COL. L. REV. 299 (1947). Compare the right to picket: Jaffe,
In Defense of the Supreme Court's Picketing Doctrine, 41 MICH. L. REV. 1037 (1943);
Teller, Picketing and Free Speech, 56 HARV. L. REv. 180 (1942); Dodd, Picketing and
Free Speech: A Dissent, 56 HARv. L. REV. 513 (1943); Teller, Picketing and Free
Speech: A Reply, 56 HARv. L. REV. 532 (1943).

13. Dorchy v. Kansas, 272 U. S. 306, 311, 47 Sup. Ct. 86, 71 L. Ed. 248 (1926).

14. E.g., 61 STAT. 141 (1947), 29 U. S. C. A. § 158 (Supp. 1948).
15. A strike by municipal employees was enjoined as unlawful, Los Angeles v.
64,405
Los Angeles Building & Construction Trades Council, 14 CCH LAB. CAS.

(Calif. Super. Ct. 1948) ; see Railway Mail Ass'n v. Murphy, 180 Misc. 868, 44 N. Y. S.
2d 601, 607 (Sup. Ct. 1943).
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recently been passed forbidding government employees to strike.' 1 Typical
of these is the New York statufe, 17 which, after defining strikes, sets forth the
following provisions: (1) that nothing shall interfere with the employees' expressions of grievances, so long as such expressions do not interfere with the
performance of their duties;18 (2) that no public employee shall strike;19
(3) that no person in authority shall have power to authorize or consent to
strikes by public employees ;20 (4) that any violator of the statute shall be
deemed to have abandoned his employment and shall not be entitled to any
rights or emoluments thereof, except if re-appointed as provided in this
statute ;21 (5) that any violator may be re-appointed only on the following conditions, (a) that his compensation not exceed that received immediately prior
to the violation, (b) that his compensation not be increased until two years
after his re-employment, (c) that the violator be on probation for five-years
after re-employment during which time he shall serve without tenure and at
the pleasure of the appointing officer ;22 and (6) a provision for hearings to
determine whether or not an employee has violated the statute.23 The Michigan
statute gives the state labor mediation board authority to mediate the griev-.
ances of public employees. 24 The Pennsylvania statute sets up a complete procedure for the adjustment of grievances of public employees. 25 The Missouri
statute makes it a misdemeanor for any government employee to strike.26
No cases have arisen under these statutes; conse4uently their constitutionality has not been passed upon. Compelling analogies from which the
courts can find ample support for the constitutionality of these statutes may
be found, however, in cases upholding restrictions on the political activity of
government employees, 27 in cases upholding the refusal of government ad16. 61 STAT. 160 (1947), 29 U. S. C. A. § 188 (Supp. 1948); MicH. STAT. Azm.
§ 17.455 (Henderson Cum. Supp. 1947);2 Mo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10178.207 (Cum. Supp.
1948); N. Y. CIVIL SFRvIcE LAW § 2 (a), 21 ST. JoHN's L. REV. 248 (1947); Omo
GEN. CODE ANN. §§ 17(7)-17(12) (Cum. Supp. 1948) ; TEx. STAT., RXV. Civ. art. 5 154(c)

(Vernon 1947); VA. CODE A,N. § 2695h (Cum. Supp. 1948). A similar Pennsylvania
statute is set out in full in 20 LAD. RFL. RE. (Lab. Rel. Ref. Man.) 3065 (1947). A
few cities have ordinances barring strikes by their employees. ZIsCIND, op. cit. supra
note 4, at 234;" 16 LAB. REL. RE. 2227 (1945). Appropriation acts have also been used
as a means of deterring strikes by government employees. 19 LAB. REL. REP. (Lab. Rel.
Ref. Man.) 50 (1947); 20 LAB. REL. REP. (Lab. Rel. Ref. Man.) 19 (1947).
17. N. Y. CIVIL SERVICE LAW § 22(a).
18. Id. § 22 (a) 1. The statutes of Michigan, Ohio, Pennsylvania and Texas have
similar provisions.
19. Id. § 22(a) 2. Similar provisions in statutes of United States, Michigan, Ohio,
Pennsylvania and Texas.
20. Id. § 22(a) 3. Similar provisions in statutes of Michigan, Ohio and Pennsylvania.
21. Id. § 22(a) 4. Similar provisions in statutes of United States, Michigan, Ohio,
Pennsylvania and Texas.
22. Id. § 22(a) 5. Similar provisions in statutes of Michigan, Ohio and Pennsylvania.
23. Id. § 22(a) 6. Similar provisions in statutes of Michigan, Ohio and Pennsylvania.
24. Micu. STAT. ANN. §17.455(7) (Henderson Cum. Supp. 1947).
25. 20 LAB. REL. REP. (Lab. Rel. Ref. Man.) 3065 (1947).
26. Mo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10178.207 (Cum. Supp. 1948).
27. E.g. United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U. S. 75, 67 Sup. Ct. 556, 91 L. Ed.
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ministrators to hire union employees, 28 in cases upholding the firing of government employees engaged in union activity, 20 and in cases upholding the imposition of restrictions on strikes by private employees.8 0
II
In the absence of statutes expressly forbidding government employees to
strike, the law is unsettled as to whether or not they can. Where such statutes
have been adopted, it is not certain that they provide the best solution to the
problems raised in strikes by government employees. This unsettled condition
of the law calls for the development of a definite policy for court or legislative
action in this field. The purpose of this note is to examine the various principles
involved and to suggest which of them should be deemed controlling in the
3
formulation of such a policy. '
The basic human relations are essentially the same in any employer-employee relationship. 32 Wherever some men are managed by others, frictions,
grievances and disputes inevitably arise. Misunderstandings and jealousies,
stubbornness and pride, unsatisfactory wages or hours, tedious or boring work,
favoritism, poor equipment and a host of other possibilities, real or fancied,
may cause dissatisfaction. Dissatisfaction breeds frictions and grievances. If
these are not adequately dealt with, serious disputes arise. In the normal
course of events these disputes will be settled by negotiation, conciliation or
arbitration; but these methods may fail. The employees may resort to the
strike in an attempt to force a favorable settlement of the disputed issues. This
pattern of employment relations is not substantially altered by the mere fact
that the employer involved is some unit or agency of the government.3 3 Strikes
in government employment have had the same causes as those in private em754 (1947), 32 MINN. L. REv. 176 (1948), 33 VA. L. Ray. 345 (1947); Notes, 33 CORN.
L. Q. 133 (1947), 15 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 443 (1947).

28. E.g., Seattle High School Chap. No. 200 v. Sharples, 159 Wash. 424, 293 Pac.
994 (1930).
29. E.g., McAuliffe v. Mayor, 155 Mass. 216, 29 N. E. 517 (1892); C. I. 0. v.
Dallas, 198 S. W. 2d 143 (Tex. Civ. App. 1946).
30. E.g., United States v. International L. & W. Union, 78 F. Supp. 710 (N. D.
Calif. 1948).
31. Policy is ultimately a matter of valuation. A discussion of policy therefore is
meaningless outside the context of given value premises. The premises underlying this
discussion, in addition to those stated above, are: (1) the problems of labor relations
are primarily problems of efficient personnel management and not of legal theory, (2)
voluntary means for the settlement of disputes must be emphasized with compulsives
used only as measures of last resort, (3) strikes are inherently wasteful and should be
minimized where possible, (4) in so far as strikes are caused by poor working conditions or the lack of effective grievance procedures, they will best be remedied by improving working conditions and providing adequate grievance procedures, (5) the
welfare of society may require the imposition of restrictions and limitations on the freedom of action of both employer and employee.

32.

MOSHER AND

KINGSLEY,

PUBLIC

PERSONNEL

ADMINiSmnATvoN

542

(1941);

Selekman and Selekman, Reducing Friction in Employer-Entployce Relationships, 12
LAW & CONTEMP. PRoB. 232 (1947).

33.

YODER, PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS

23 (1948).

1949 ]

445"*

NOTES

ployment 3 4 Essentially the same issues have been involved. The same methods
and tactics have been used. The same general policies should be applied to
strikes in government employment as are applied to strikes in private employment.
III
It has often been asserted, however, by people of various political leanings,
that strikes by government employees cannot be tolerated. 3 5 They are spoken
of as insurrections ;36 and it is said that to permit government employees to
strike would be to invite a labor dictatorship. 37 A number of arguments have
been advanced in support of the contentions that government employees have
no right to strike and should not be given one. The four principal arguments
are: (1) that logical deductions from the orthodox theory of sovereignty demonstrate that strikes by government employees are inherently unlawful; (2) that
the loss of a strike by "the government" would cause such a loss of prestige as
to seriously weaken the authoritj of the government; (3) that strikes by government employees are unnecessary; (4) that strikes by government employees
are inevitably ineffectual.
(1) The central argument of those who would forbid the strike to all
government employees as such lies in the orthodox theory of sovereignty. 38
The people are the ultimate repository of authority. They can act, however,
only through the sovereign state, which is therefore the embodiment of the
will of the people. The state's employees are the means by which the will of
the people is effectuated, and herein they differ from private employees. The
government employee owes unquestioning loyalty and obedience to the state,
39
for to disobey the state is to disobey and to thwart the will of the people.
34. ZISicIND, op. cit. supra note 4, c. 12. Government employees have struck principally to enforce demands for higher wages or shorter hours or because of the refusal of
some administrator to permit union activity.
35. Coolidge, Hoover, F. D. Roosevelt, Truman and La Guardia have been quoted
to that'effect. Spero, Collective Bargaining in the Public Service, 248 ANNALS 146,
149 (1946). A number of city attorneys and attorneys-general have voiced similar
opinions. RHYNE, LABOR UNIONS AND MUNICIPAL EMPLOYEE LAW 138 (1946). It has
been suggested that this attitude is more emotional than rational. ZIsKIND, op. cit. supra
note 4, at 251; Note, 54 HARV. L. REV. 1360, 1365 (1941).
36. RHYNE, LABOR UNIONS AND MUNICIPAL EMPLOYEE LAW 138 (1946).
37. Kaplan, Have Public Employees the Right to Strike?-No, 30 NAT. MUNIC.
REv. 518, 523 (1941).
38. For discussions of the sovereignty argument see COMMITTEE ON EMPLOYEE
RELATIONS

IN

THE PUBLIC SERVICE,

E-MPLOYEE

RELATIONS

IN

THE PUBLIC

SERVICE

57 (1942) ; SPERo, Employer and Employee in the Public Service in PROBLEMS OF THE
AMiERICAN PUBLIC SERVICE 175 (1935); Agger, The Government and Its Employees,
47 YALE L. J. 1109 (1938) ; Johnson, General Unions in the Federal Service, 2 J. OF POL.
23 (1940) ; Spero, Collective Bargainingin the Public Service, 248 ANNALS 146 (1946) ;
Watt, The Divine Right of Government by Judiciary, 14 U. OF CHI. L. REv. 409, 453
(1947).
39. The theory of sovereignty forms the basis of certain arguments by analogy.
The right to strike, it is argued, is analogous to the right to sue the state; unless the
sovereign permits, it cannot be done. Kaplan, sztpra note 37, at 520. The government
employee has been likened to the soldier. It has been argued that the sovereign demands
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A strike by government employees is an act of disobedience to the sovereign
and thus a challenge to properly constituted authority.4 0 It is in effect a revolution.
A fundamental objection to this argument lies in its absolutist overtones.
If the state can demand unquestioning obedience of six million employees, it
is but a short step to demanding unquestioning obedience from all its subjects.
Does this theory of the sovereign state accurately portray the nature of the
democratic state? Assuming that it does, is a strike by government employees
necessarily an act of disobedience to the sovereign? Might it not be more accurate to consider such a strike as merely a means of calling the sovereign's
attention to grievances and disputes which other agents of the sovereign have
seen fit to ignore? To answer such questions would necessitate the working
out of comprehensive theories of the democratic state and of the nature of
strikes, 'a task beyond the scope of this Note. In any event the major premises
41
of this argument lie in a disputed, if not discredited, theory of the state.
(2) The authority of the state depends in a large measure on its prestige,
and therefore public policy cannot tolerate a loss of prestige on the part of
the state. The loss of a strike, it is argued, would entail such a loss. 42, But it is
doubtful if it would be such a loss of prestige as to cause a breakdown of the
state's authority. A greater loss might occur by the resort to repressive labor
policies. In any event no strike by government employees has yet had the effect of causing a breakdown of the state's authority. 43 The rights of government employees should not be predicated upon hypothetical possibilities.
(3) Strikes by government employees are unnecessary, it is argued, because the government employee can have no legitimate reason to strike. It is
contended that the government employee stands in a favored and protected
position," and that he has a number of benefits not open to the private employee. This argument, however, does not rest on a solid factual basis. 45 Many
government employees do not have adequate protection and security; qven

the same discipline, loyalty and obedience from both.
IN

CoMMITtE ON EMPLOYEE RELATIONS

45 (1942).
40. This argument is applicable to all government employees. RHYNE, op. cit. supra

THE PUBLIC SERVICE, EMPLOYEE RELATIONS IN

THE PUBLIC SERVICE

note 36, at 53, 138; TELLER, A LABOR POLICY FOR AMERICA 275 (1945).
41. COHEN, RECENT THEORIES OF SOVEREIGNTY (1937) and bibliography therein.
See also, FINER, THEORY AND PRACTICE OF MODERN GOVERNMENT 819 (Guthrie rev.
1934).
42. Com-mI-rEE ON EMPLOYEE RELATIONS IN THE PUBLIC SERVICE, Op. Cit. supra
note 39, at 45; SPERo, Employer and Employee in the Public Service in PROBLEIMS OF TIlE
AMERICAN PUBLIC SERVICE 175 (1935).
43. ZISKINB, op. cit. supra note 4, at 191, 249.
44. In the Matter of Hatton, Civil Service Commission of New Jersey (1942), set
out in full, RHYNE, op. cit. supra note 36, at 222.
45. COMMITTEE ON EMPLOYEE RELATIONS IN THE PUBLIC SERVICE, op. cit. supra
note 39, at 60 (1942) ; Agger, The Government and Its Employees, 47 YALE L. J. 1109,
1127 (1938); Baldwin, Have Public Employees the Right to Strike?-Yes, 30 NAT.

MUmlC. REV.' 515 (1941) ; Mire, Collective Bargaining in the Public Service, 36 AM.
EcoN. REv. 347, 348 (1948).
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46
those within civil service systems may sometimes have serious grievances.
A similar contention is that since the government does not function for
profit there is no basis for the exploitation of its employees, and therefore
t
they should have no grievances and no need of the strikeY The number of
strikes in w.hich government employees have participated is in itself enough
evidence to show the extent of their grievances. Moreover, it is doubtful if
strikes in private or government employment are caused so much by exploitation as by the inevitable conflict of interests between manager and worker.
Furthermore, while no drive for profits may affect government employees,
they generally bear the brunt of the economy programs which are constantly
48
urged on all governmental bodies.
Assuming that government employees do have serious grievances, strikes
by government employees are still unnecessary, it is argued, because there are
49
other and better means by which those grievances may be remedied. First,
government employees may resort to arbitration and mediation boards; second,
they may bring the pressure of public opinion on administrators and legislators.
But government employees are generally denied access to the various arbitration and mediation boards set up under the federal and state labor relations
acts.50 Though some governmental units have provided internal machinery
for the hearing and settlement of the grievances of their employees, generally
no adequate machinery exists.5 1
Government employers are more responsive to the pressure of public
opinion than private employers. However, restrictions on the right of government employees to organize or to participate actively in politics in a large
measure prevent government employees from crystallizing public opinion so as
2
to change the employment practices of their employers.5 They may take advantage of the responsiveness of their employers to public opinion by sponsoring organized lobbies to further their interests before the various legislative
bodies. Some government employees do support such lobbies, and they have
53
been rather effective in protecting the employees' interests. But, while the

46. Agger, supra note 45, at 1127.

47. This argument is discussed by Baldwin, supra note 45, at 515; Mire, supra
note 45, at 349.
48. COMMITTEE ON EMPLOYEE RELATIONS

IN

THE

PUBLIC SERVICE,

Op. Cit. .supra

note 39, at 50.
49. RHYNE, op. cit. supra note 36, at 153; Kaplan, supra note 37; Note, 54 HARV.
L. REV. 1360, 1365 (1941).
50. E.g., 61 STAT. 137 (1947), 29 U. S. C. A. § 152 (Supp. 1948). N. Y. LABOR LAW
§ 715; See, however, 12 MICH. STAT. ANN. § 17.455 (Henderson, Cum. Supp. 1947).
51. See note 45 supra; Westwood, The "Right" of an Employee of the United
States against Arbitrary Discharge, 7 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 212 (1938).
52. For examples of restrictions on the organization of government employees see
cases collected in note 3 supra. For examples of restrictions on political activity see,
53 STAT. 1148 (1939), 18 U. S. C. A. § 61h (Supp. 1948); Oklahoma v. United States
Civil Service Commission, 330 U. S.127, 67 Sup. Ct. 544, 91 L. Ed. 794 (1947) ; United
Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U. S.75, 67 Sup. Ct. 556, 91 L. Ed. 754 (1947) ; EX
parte Curtis, 106 U. S.371, 1 Sup.'Ct. 38, 27 L. Ed. 232 (1882).
53. ZisiND, op. cit. supra note 4, at 246.
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organized lobby may be a very effective means of influencing legislators, it is
not the proper instrument for handling labor disputes. It is, moreover, too subject to abuse to be encouraged.
(4) The banning of strikes by government employees is further supported
by the contention that such strikes are inevitably ineffectual. 54 Some conditions
of government employment are directly controlled by legislative bodies, and
others must be within the bounds of general statutes and fixed budgets; such
conditions cannot be changed without resort to the cumbersome legislative
process. A strike involving such conditions, it is argued, is more likely to induce repressive than favorable action. Frequently, however, administrative officers have wide discretionary powers over working conditions. Furthermo;re
many strikes by government employees have been effective in improving workin conditions. 55
There are, however, more fundamental reasons for asserting that strikes
by government employees cannot be effective. A strike is effective as an economic weapon and as an instrument of propaganda. In its economic aspect a
strike by government employees would have to contend with the tremendous resources of the government. As an instrument of propaganda it would meet a
wall of hostile public opinion, for neither the strike nor the government employee is a popular favorite.5 6 But this argument is directed to the tactical question of whether government employees should resort to the strike and not to the
question of whether they are or should be forbidden to strike under all circum57
stances.
IV
The social welfare demands the continuity of certain essential services.
An employee upon undertaking such an essential service assumes a duty to
the community to maintain that continuity, even at the risk of suffering injustice to himself.58 The most cogent argument for denying the strike to any
group of employees is that their services come within this essential class5D
54. This argument is discussed by Ziskind, op. cit. supra note 4, at 254; Agger, supra

note 45, at 1132; Note, HARv. L. REv. 1360, 1365 (1941).

55. ZISKIND, op. cit. supra note 4, at 254.
56. Agger, supra note 45, at 1110. Compare YODER, PERSONNEL MANAGE-IMENT AND

INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS 780 (1948).

57. For discussions of the attitudes of government employees towards strikes in

government employment and the policies adopted by the various unions with members
drawn from government employees see COMMITTEE ON EMPLOYEE RELATIONS IN THE
PUBLIC SERVICE, op. cit. supra note 39, at 112-114; ZISKIND, op. cit. supra note 4, at
202-214; Spero, Have Public Employees the Right to Strikef-Maybe, 30 NAT. MUNIc.

REV. 524, 526 (1941).
58. "All rights are derived from the purposes of the society in which they exist;
above all rights rises duty to the community." Mr. Justice Brandeis, dissenting, in Duplex
Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U. S. 443, 488, 41 Sup. Ct. 172, 65 L. Ed. 349 (1921).
59. For a general discussion of the effect of the public interest in strikes see Smith,
The Effect of the Public Interest on the Right to Strike and to Bargain Collecti'ely,

27 N. C. L. REV. 206 (1949). It has been said that labor has already lost the right to
strike in those key industries in ,Vhich continuity of operation is essential. Rosenfarb,
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Several statutes have been enacted in an attempt to maintain the continuity of those services deemed essential to the public welfare. The LaborManagement Relations Act of 1947 contained sections authorizing injunctions
against strikes imperilling the national safety. 60 Some states have statutes providing for the compulsory arbitration of labor disputes in public utilities. 61
Other states provide for the seizure of strike bound utilities as a means of enforcing compulsory arbitration. 62 Virginia has enacted a statute authorizing
the seizure of strike bound utilities, and providing criminal penalties for strik63
ing, picketing or otherwise interfering with the operation of the seized plants.
The particular procedures adopted in these statutes may or may not be
desirable. The important thing for the present purpose is that these statutes emThe Admniistrative State: Compulsives in Labor Relations, 23 N. C. L. REV. 89, 99
(1945).
60. 61 STAT. 155, 156 (1947), 29 U. S. C. A. §§ 176-180 (Supp. 1948). The provison
was upheld in United States v. International L. & W. Union, 78 F. Supp. 710 (N. D.
Calif. 1948). The effect of these sections is to provide for an extended cooling-off period.
For a short history of the provision see, TnE TAFT-HARTLEY AcT, AFTER ONE YEAR,

c. 14 (B. N. A. 1948).
61. FLA. STAT. ANN., c. 453 (Cum. SupI. 1947); IND. ANN. STAT., §§ 40-2401,
40-2415 (Burns Supp. 1947); MIcH. STAT. ANN., § 17.454(14) (Henderson Cum.
Supp. 1947); NEB. REv. STAT. § 48-802 (Cum. Supp. 1947); Wis. Laws 1947, c. 414.
statutes are
Compare MINN. STAT. ANN. § 179.38 (West Cum. Supp. 1948). These
discussed in TELLER, LABOR DISPUTES AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING § 4 2 3v (Supp. 1948).
The Michigan statute was held unconstitutional as an attempt to confer on judicial officers
non-judicial powers and duties. Local 170 v. Gadola, 34 N. W. 2d 71 (Mich. 1948).

The Wisconsin statute was upheld in United Gas, etc. Workers v. Wisconsin Emp. Rel.
Board, 16 CCH LAB. CAS ff 64,905 (Wis. Cir. Ct. 1948). See also Updegraff, Public Utility Labor Problems, 33 IowA L. REv. 609 (1948).

A bill has been introduced in the Tennessee General Assembly to provide for the
uninterrupted service by any public or private corporation, or other agency, generating
or distributing electric energy in Tennessee; and to make provisions for the prompt,
peaceful and just settlement of labor disputes between such corporations and their
employees. Tenn., House Bill No. 539, 76th General Assembly (1949). The bill expressly
covers any municipality or public authority engaged in distributing or generating
electric energy. Some of the more important provisions of the bill are: (1) that it
shall be unlawful for any employee within the terms of the bill to strike without first
having given thirty days notice to the Railroad and Public Utilities Commission and to
the utility; (2) that if the parties are unable to adjust the issues between them the
Railroad and Public Utilities Commission shall hear the issues; (3) that when a contract exists between the parties, the commission shall have power to determine only the
proper interpretation and application of the contract; (4) that where no such contract
exists, or where the dispute is as to a new contract the commission shall have power
to establish rates of pay and conditions of employment; (5) this determination of the
dispute will be binding on the parties, and shall continue in effect for one year from
date it is made; (6) that during the time of the proceedings described by the bill,
and during the effective period of final orders, it shall be unlawful for any employees
covered by the terms of the bill to strike.
62. MAss. ANN. LAWS c. 150B (Cum. Supp. 1948); Mo. REV. STAT. ANN. §
10178.119 (Cum. Supp. 1948); for discussion see TELLER, .op. cit. supra note-61, at §
423V. A similar New Jersey statute is set out with amendments 4 CCH LAB. LAW. SERV.
ff 41,530 (1948); it is discussed in Note, 59 HARV. L. REV. 1002 (1946). The New
Jersey statute was upheld. New Jersey v. Traffic Telephone Workers, 15 CCH LAB.
CAs. 164,769 (N. j. Ch. 1948). Compare TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. art. 1446a (Cum. Supp.
1948). See also Teller, Government Seizure in Labor Dispuies, 60 HARV. L. REV. 1017
(1947) ; Willcox and Landis. Government Seigures in Labor Disputes, 34 CORN. L. Q.
155 (1948). For a general discussion of these statutes see Notes, [1948] Wis. L. REy.
597, 97 U. OF PA. L. REV. 410 (1949). In general, see Sigal, National Emergency Strikes
and the Public Interest, 27 N. C. L. REv. 213 (1949).
63. VA. CODE AiN. § 1887 (120) (Cum. Supp. 1948).
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body a policy of distinguishing between strikes in essential and those in nonessential services. That policy is equally as applicable in government as in
private employment. It is apparent that many if not most government activities are not so vital to the community that no break in their continuity could
be tolerated. Only those government employees engaged in essential services
should be prohibited from striking. It is beyond the scope of this Note to attempt to set out which services are and which are not essential. It is doubtful,
moreover, if any useful classification could be made, for what is essential under
one set of conditions might not be so under others.
V
The strike is an inherently wasteful instrument of social action. It tends
to deepen the animosities out of which it arises. But it is the ultimate weapon of
any group of employees in a dispute with their employers. Its undesirable
qualities necessitate the imposition of restrictions on its use; but its importance
to employees requires that those restrictions be imposed only where they are
necessary for the public welfare. The central problem of the law of strikes is
to reconcile these conflicting policies.
It has been the purpose of this Note to examine the various principles and
arguments involved in the development of a policy for court or legislative action with regard to strikes by government employees. 4 It is suggested that
the following principles should be controlling in the determination of that
policy: (1) the general policies of the law towards striking private employees
are applicable to striking government employees; (2) strikes by government
employees are not all necessarily unlawful; (3) the legality of a strike by
government employees depends upon its objects and upon the means used to
attain them; (4) the public interest in the continuity of those government
services deemed essential to the public welfare is such that the disruption of
those services by strike is outside the scope of legitimate labor activity.
WILLIAM V. SANFORD
64. For suggested approaches to the problem of strikes by government employees:
CommifsnT
ON EMPLOYEE RELATIONS IN THE PUBLIC SERVICE, op. cit. supra note 39,
c. 4; MOSHER AND KINGSLEY, PUBLIC PERSONNEL ADMINISTRATION 584 (1941); ZISKIND,

op. cit. supra note 4, at 258; Spero, supra note 57, at 528; Report of New Jersey

Governor's Commission, 11

LAB. REL. REP.

2556 (1942).

